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Abstract
This thesis is both an exploration of some of the
concepts surrounding the Multidoor Courthouse (a recent
alternative to criminal and civil courts) and the development
of a citizen participation process for planning the
implementation of a Multidoor Courthouse (MDC). The working
hypothesis of this thesis is that alternatives to justice like
the MDC must be planned with consideration of the political,
social and economic characteristics of each site, such that
each MDC will have a unique structure and relationship to its
surroundings.
The thesis presents: a theoretical study of the
development of the Multidoor Courthouse concept; a study of
three MDC pilot projects; critical variables that affect the
application of the concept in empirical settings; an empirical
analysis of Minnesota as a potential site for a MDC; and
finally a planning process that will enable citizens to
develop a Multidoor Courthouse.
Chapter One sketches a brief history of the alternative
justice movement focusing on "efficiency," "access to justice"
and "community building" as goals of the movement. The
Multidoor Courthouse is then described as a response to a
fourth and distinct goal--that of providing "effective"
resolution of disputes. Through documentary analysis and
interviews with key participants in three MDC pilot projects,
located in Tulsa, Oklahoma, Houston, Texas, and Washington,
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D.C., the thesis traces the divergent development of these
three sites.
Chapter Two describes the history and current status of
alternative dispute resolution in Minnesota. In particular,
it identifies three characteristics of that region that
determine the nature of the MDC planning process: a culture
valuing decentralization, public participation, and consensual
decision making; attitudes of local service providers about
intake and referral; and a large base of community
organizations.
Chapter Three creates a three way planning process among
government organizations, private professional organizations,
and community organizations. It traces the origins of the
planning process and describes how the three types of
organizations would participate with the help of mediators in
highly structured consensual decision making to develop a plan
for a Multidoor Courthouse. Chapter Four presents the
conclusions.
For Minnesota, the thesis provides a blueprint for the
development of a Multidoor Courthouse. On a broader scale the
thesis proposes a model for planning and citizen participation
that could be applied in any setting and for alternatives to
justice other than the Multidoor Courthouse.
Thesis Supervisors: Leonard G. Buckle and Suzann Thomas-Buckle
- 3 -
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Abstract 2
Table of Contents 4
Introduction 6
CHAPTER ONE: THE CONCEPT AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION 11
I. The Evolution of the Multidoor Courthouse 11
Background 12
Alternative Dispute Resolution: Some
Issues from the Pound Conference 14
II. Critical Aspects of the Multidoor
Courthouse 16
Matching Alternative Processes to
Disputes: Some Criteria and
Examples 18
Matching Alternative Processes to
Disputes: The Intake Worker 23
III. The Multidoor Court Pilot Projects 27
Overview 27
The Pilot Projects 29
District of Columbia 29
Tulsa 31
Houston 33
CHAPTER TWO: HISTORY AND CURRENT STATUS OF
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN
MINNESOTA
I. An Overview of the Dispute Resolution
Environment 36
Introduction 36
Private Organizations 37
Public Organizations 41
Non-Court-Based Programs 41
Court-Based Programs 42
1984 ADR Legislation 43
- 4 -
II. The Political and Social Landscape 45
Political Culture 45
Issues of Intake, Referral and
Centralization 49
Issues of Importance to Neighborhood
Organizations and Public
Interest groups 53
1. Neighborhood Organizations 53
2. Public Interest groups 56
CHAPTER THREE: THE PLANNING PROCESS
I. Design of the Process 61
II. The Planning Process 64
Phase One: Organizing 64
Phase Two: The Pre-Planning Process 65
Phase Three: Issue Development Phase 68
Phase Four: Joint Goal Setting 69
Phase Five: The Implementation Plan 70
III. A Possible Outcome 70
CHAPTER FOUR: CONCLUSION 77
BIBLIOGRAPHY 83
- 5 -
J~Itt-oaLctJsm
The movement to establish alternatives to the traditional
court system is growing rapidly. Throughout this country
Neighborhood Justice Centers, Conflict Clinics, Children's
Hearings Offices, and other "alternatives" are available to
people with disputes. The most recently implemented and
perhaps most innovative of these is the Multidoor Courthouse,
which was invented by Professor Frank Sander of Harvard Law
School. (Sander, 1979) Sander's original vision of the
Multidoor Courthouse was of a center which "under one roof"
would contain a variety of these "alternatives," in addition
to litigation. Such a center would contain a number of
"doors" any one of which citizens with a complaint could enter
in order to have their disputes resolved. These doors might
contain labels such as mediation, arbitration, fact finding,
or ombudsman. The goal of the Multidoor Courthouses would be
to match the dispute to the "door" which can most effectively
resolve it.
People entering this courthouse would go first to an
intake area where an intake specialist would help them decide
what the most appropriate forum would be for their disputes.
If it were determined that mediation was the most appropriate,
then they might proceed to the mediation door, where a
publicly funded mediator would be available. If at any point
it were decided that they needed an adversarial process,
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litigation would still be a possibility, as would the host of
other forums and actions, including withdrawing the claim.
Likewise a group of citizens with a claim against the
government or an industry might elect to go through an
ombudsmen door, or a door designed for handling large scale
disputes such as environmental or community disputes.
There would be both court based and non-court based
options. In addition to the variety of new "doors" that might
be available in the courthouse (court-based doors), an intake
service would be capable of referring people to doors that are
already in existence in the community (non court-based doors),
such as neighborhood justice centers, legal services, an
Attorney General's consumer complaints department, or even to
a variety of social services.
This paper has been written to explore the possibility of
adopting such a Multidoor Courthouse in the state of
Minnesota. I selected this state both because providers of
alternative dispute resolution have expressed an interest in
building a Multidoor Courthouse there and because Minnesota is
an environment which seems amenable to the kind of social
experimentation that adopting a Multidoor Courthouse would
involve.
While this is an academic paper written to explore some
of issues associated with the development and implementation
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of the Multidoor Courthouse, the paper is also a proposal for
the planning of a Multidoor Court, to be submitted to the
Conflict Analysis Center at the University of Minnesota. The
proposed planning process is an attempt to bring together
people who are primarily concerned with dispute resolution in
a forum which would allow them to explore what the Multidoor
Courthouse concept has to offer to Minnesota. It is expected
that citizen representatives, representatives of private
dispute resolution providers, and government representatives
would collaborate in this process to make public
recommendations about the development of a Multidoor
Courthouse.
The central argument of this paper is that the
implementation of the Multidoor Courthouse concept in any
particular region necessitates an individualized planning
process which takes into consideration that region's
political, social, economic, and institutional needs. In the
following pages I develop the argument that as the government
and other powerful forces in Minnesota begin to
institutionalize alternative dispute resolution processes,
such as the Multidoor Courthouse, community members and
existing social networks will be adversely affected unless
they have a voice and a role in planning for dispute
resolution. Finally, I conclude that to counter these effects
a community-oriented planning process should be adopted.
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In order to explore the environment for dispute
resolution in Minnesota and to study the Multidoor Courthouse
concept as it has been implemented in three pilot projects
based in Washington, D.C., Tulsa, Oklahoma, and Houston,
Texas, I conducted more than thirty interviews. These
interviews were conducted by telephone and in person with a
variety of people associated with the Multidoor pilot project
in Washington, D.C. and also with alternative dispute
resolution providers, court administrators, and social
scientists in Minnesota.
The research for this project has been designed and
evaluated through many hours of collaboration with Professor
Frank Sander of Harvard Law School, who is the originator of
the Multidoor Courthouse concept. I have also collaborated
extensively with Drs. Suzann Thomas-Buckle and Leonard Buckle
of the Urban Studies and Planning Department at MIT in
designing the research and developing the concept of the
paper.
Assistance and advice was also provided by Dr. Thomas
Fuitak at the University of Minnesota. In addition to to the
interviews, information about the Multidoor pilot projects was
provided through the ABA's Special Committee on Alternative
1. No list of interviewees is provided due to my promise of
confidentiality to participants.
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Dispute Resolution in Washington, D.C. with special help from
Larry Ray.
Chapter One of the paper looks at the development of the
Multidoor concept, gives brief descriptions of the pilot
projects and begins to identify problems associated with its
implementation.
Chapter Two describes the Minnesota dispute resolution
environment and identifies specific problems associated with
implementation of a Multidoor Courthouse in Minnesota.
Chapter Three recommends a specific Multidoor planning
process for Minnesota derived from issues and concerns
identified in Chapters One and Two.
Chapter Four is a general conclusion which draws
implications for other regions from observations made about
Minnesota and the three Multidoor pilot projects.
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The Multidoor Courthouse (MDC) concept was first made
public in St. Paul Minnesota in 1976 at a gathering which is
now known as the Pound Conference. The conference was
convened in commemoration of an address given seventy years
earlier by Roscoe Pound to the American Bar Association. The
title of Pound's original presentation was "The Causes of
Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice."
Reviving Pound's theme, the 1976 conference was organized as a
vehicle for a serious and comprehensive examination of
questions troubling the legal profession.
The keynote address of the conference was delivered at
the same podium in the Minnesota Legislative Chamber where
Pound spoke seventy years earlier. It opened the sessions
with a view of long term trends in the administration of
justice and a call for planning to prepare for problems
unresolved.
In the section that follows I discuss the broad legal and
political context in which the Multidoor Court was designed
and the issues that were being raised at that time about
alternative dispute resolution.
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At the time the Pound Conference was taking place in 1976
a movement openly critical of the justice system was
occurring. The roots of the movement although quite complex
were clearly associated with the Civil Rights movement and the
War in Vietnam. A primary concern growing out of this period
was the lack of access to the justice system. This is the
same period which gave rise to the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
OSHA, and reformation of the securities laws. Cumulatively
these changes and the accompanying political and social
activism of the time had the effect of greatly increasing the
number and kinds of cases in the courts. Those for whom
access to justice was the issue were trying to get the courts
to recognize and uphold the rights of low income people,
consumers, minorities, women, employees, tenants and others
who had not had their "day in court."
Simultaneously with this increase in the number and kinds
of cases in the courts was a movement to deemphasize the use
of lawyers and legal institutions. This movement emphasized
the use of mediation not only to resolve individual problems
but to help citizens to develop problem solving skills that
would build more cohesive communities. These skills and
techniques could then be used to create health care centers,
day care, job opportunities and other social structures that
- 12 -
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would help to eliminate the economic bases of peoples' legal
problems.
Thus out of this same period there were at least two
parallel arguments being made about justice. One grew out of
a notion of justice that focused on gaining greater access to
the formal justice system. The other was concerned with
creating alternatives to the justice system. As courts in
their role as administrators of justice began to react to
their rapidly increasing caseloads and their needs for cost
effectiveness and efficiency, many seized on this second
notion of justice -- the referral of cases to alternative
dispute resolution processes. (Buckle and Thomas Buckle,
1982)
For those working to get access to justice by bringing
the cases of underrepresented people into court any new trend
by the courts to "farm these cases out" to alternatives was
seen as a step backwards. They feared that alternative
dispute resolution processes would be a form of second class
justice and a way for courts to avoid pressing social
problems. (Singer, n.d.)
For those who were trying to establish programs out of
the desire to create a separate justice system, the
possibility of courts referring cases to alternatives would be
a mixed blessing. Referred cases would of course mean more
- 13 -
people using alternatives, but it would also mean dependency
on the court system -- the same system from which programs
were trying to remain separate. (Shonholtz, 1984)
Rplud-Cpafa-r eTx-ncL
At the Pound Conference a significant number of the
addresses given were about issues related to alternative
dispute resolution, that reflect the divergent concerns for
access to justice and efficiency -- for court based and
non-court based alternatives. Supreme Court Chief Justice
Warren Burger, for example, argued that alternative dispute
resolution can be valuable in helping the courts to become
more cost effective and efficient. (Levin and Wheeler, 1979)
Judge A. Leon Higgenbotham, Jr., on the other hand, responded
to this argument for effectiveness and efficiency by
cautioning that the "accessible" justice system that had just
begun to be gained in the last decade was in danger of being
lost, if the courts diverted important disputes from the
courts solely for reasons of cost or efficiency. He
emphasized the rights of low income people, working people,
and minorities to be heard in court. He expressed the fear
that people could be referred to alternative dispute
resolution processes just to lighten the case loads in the
courts and that those without the means or knowledge to
contest the results would become victims of the court system
and its alternatives. (Levin and Wheeler, 1979, pp. 87-109)
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A related set of observations was presented by Professor
of Anthropology, Laura Nader as she asked why a conference
concerned with ppppALa causes of dissatisfaction with the
justice system was limiting itself to the problems of the
legal profession. She pointed to broader social roots of both
our problems and our potential solutions. Professor Nader
presented the results of some of her studies on dispute
mechanisms in other cultures and drew attention to cultures
where the seriousness of a dispute is measured by how it
effects the society as a whole, and one measure is the number
of people involved. She suggested that we pay more attention
to the ability of society to deal with group or "block"
problems such as the problems of groups of consumers,
communities, the aged, and children who are abused in
institutions. She cautioned against a justice system which
categorizes these as individual problems and then sends them
out to alternative dispute resolution forums where their
significance as collective issues may not be recognized and,
therefore, inappropriate decisions made. (Levin and Wheeler,
1979, pp. 114-119)
Whereas the comments of the speakers above were drawn
from concerns for cost effectiveness and efficiency, access to
justice, and identifying collective issues, the address given
by Frank Sander introduced a new standard for alternative
dispute resolution -- effectiveness -- and a new forum -- the
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Multidoor Court house. The idea is derived in part from the
work of legal scholars such as Lon Fuller who have studied how
different disputes lend themselves to being resolved by
different kinds of processes. (Fuller, 1971) The central goal
of the Multidoor concept is to determine the most "effective"
dispute resolution process for a given dispute. In his
address Sander developed the concept of "effective"
resolutions of disputes first by identifying a range of modes
for resolving disputes, such as adjudication, negotiation,
mediation and avoidance. Having distinguished among the
different modes he then suggested a variety of criteria by
which a person's problem might be matched with one of these
modes. Finally, he suggested an intake process through which
a person's claim can be analyzed, the criteria for effective
dispute resolution applied, and the appropriate match made
between problem and mode of dispute resolution. It is from
these three considerations that the idea emerged of a
many-doored dispute resolution center, where an intake
specialist would help people decide which door held the
appropriate process for addressing their particular problems.
Section II explores some of the critical aspects of
"effective" dispute resolution in more detail.
I I . C iiA getg-l-gtjArogtaa
Since "effective" dispute resolution means matching the
dispute to the most appropriate process, it is necessary first
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to understand the kinds of dispute resolution processes
available. In order to do that, it is helpful to visualize a
range of dispute resolution processes ordered along a
continuum like the following:
Adjudication--------Mediation------Negotiation-----Inaction2
Court Ignoring
Arbitration Tolerating
Administrative Process Lumping
Enduring
Avoiding
On the far right is a process which involves no help by
other parties in order to get the individual's dispute
resolved - inaction. Inaction includes a broad range of
nonconfrontational reactions to disputes, which involve no one
taking action but the aggrieved party. Inaction might involve
ignoring, tolerating, lumping, enduring or avoiding. On the
opposite end of the scale, is the process involving the
greatest amount of outside help for a disputant --
adjudication -- a general category of processes involving a
third party who is empowered by law to make a decision for the
disputants. Between adjudication and inaction are a variety
of other options. Next to the extreme of inaction on the far
right, is negotiation -- the most common way of resolving
disputes -- which involves the parties working out a solution
2. The basic idea for this chart comes from Sander, 1979. I
have altered it by adding the category of "Inaction."
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between themselves. It allows for complete control over the
process and decision making by the negotiating parties.
In those cases where the parties are incapable of
resolving the dispute a third party may need to be brought
in. When the third party's role is to hglp the disputing
parties work out a solution between themselves, this third
party is called a mediator. This person has no power to make
a decision for the disputants, only to guide them in resolving
the problem. The next category includes those processes where
the third party has the power to make a decision for the
disputants about the outcome of the dispute. This whole
category may be called adjudication and includes several
processes. Of course, the most well known of these
adjudicatory processes is litigation, where it is a judge who
is the third party decision maker. When the process involves
hiring a private third party to hear each side and then make a
decision this form of adjudication is called arbitration.
Various administrative processes also fall into this
category. (Sander, 1979)
ttChn Mjt~engtvy4Qcn~e~Lo Dpi~tl
SDI~st~it1eli-ansld-ximp eg
A critical aspect of the Multidoor Courthouse is
addressing the question of which of these dispute processing
mechanisms is most effective for resolving what kind of
disputes. This, of course, is the difficult challenge and the
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one on which Professor Sander believes the Multidoor
Courthouse depends.
Finding the most "effective" process for a dispute
clearly involves analyzing a variety of factors. Professor
Sander suggests that the criteria for determining the most
effective process include: the relationship between the
parties; cost to the parties and to society (what is the cost
to the other parties of not proceeding as a group?); speed;
complexity of the case; and nature of the case, which takes
into consideration such diverse issues as whether or not the
dispute is amenable to an all or nothing solution, what the
rights are of the parties, and whether it is a routine matter
which could be handled mechanically. (Sander, 1979)
Perhaps the best means to understand how these criteria
might be used is to look at some hypothetical cases in which
decisions are made about the proper process for a particular
dispute. Following are a number of sample situations in which
matching a dispute to a process is relatively simple.
Situation 1: Person A comes to the Multidoor Court intake
specialist and says that she has been unable to pay rent on
time to her landlady who lives next door. She has explained
her financial situation to the landlady several times and the
landlady agreed that she could pay her rent late when
necessary. This had never turned into a problem, and in fact
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they had developed quite a close relationship. Recently,
however, A was several days late in paying her rent and the
landlady threatened to evict her, calling her twice a day.
Tenant A thinks that maybe her landlady is having personal
problems, which are the real cause of the dispute.
This is a case which looks ideal for mediation. There is
a long-term relationship between the parties which they need
to and would like to preserve. Communication has broken down,
and the neighbors are at odds with each other. It is likely
that mediation could help them come to a more formal agreement
about the rent situation, could help them to restructure their
relationship, and also help teach them something about
communicating in the future.
Situation 2: Suppose C's Auto Parts has been supplying D,
a prosperous and busy mechanic, with parts for several years.
C now comes to the intake specialist because D has rejected a
large shipment of specialty parts worth $3,000. These are
parts that C himself "special ordered," and he cannot return
them. Because they are specialty parts, they have little use
to C. D claims that the shipment was too late and that she had
to order the parts from someone else. C wants to continue the
relationship with D. Neither C nor D wants to wait six months
to go to court.
Money claims of under $15,000 where there is a commercial
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relationship between the parties are frequently handled well
by arbitration, in which applying routine established
principles are applied to a particular set of facts.
Situation 3: E is a citizen whose lawn was severely torn
up by a garbage truck. Numerous calls to the city resulted in
endless bureaucratic runarounds but no satisfaction. E
conveys his story to the intake specialist who suggests
meeting with the city's new ombudsperson. This person is able
to make a recommendation to the appropriate department head
and dates and times for repairs are arranged.
Situation 4: F is an employee of the state. After work F
attends a political demonstration about the death penalty
laws. F is seen by his boss carrying a sign that says "The
state is the real criminall" The next day F is discharged.
In this case where F's freedom of speech is at issue, it is
clear that a court is the appropriate forum for resolving the
matter.
The situations above are relatively simple examples of
the kind of cases intake workers must process. Many problems
they meet are not so clear cut, and in some cases the
consequences of an intake specialist making improper decisions
could be serious.
If in situation 1, for example, the landlady were not a
friend of the tenant, but the owner of a large tenement, the
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intake workers' choice becomes more difficult. Let us also
assume that A was not paying rent because her heat had not
been turned on and because she was tired of rats endangering
the health of her children and her neighbors' children. Her
complaints have met with no results. The landlady is trying
to evict her.
What kind of forum is appropriate for this dispute? If A
goes to mediation what happens to all of the other tenants?
In a region where the only power tenants may have over
landlords is by their group action will individual mediations
take that away? The intake worker is in the position of
helping the person make a decision not merely about her
individual rights, but also about the rights of other people
around her.
Suppose the person was referred to a neighborhood justice
center where a mediation was set up between her and the
landlady. Will she bargain away her rights? Is she in an
inferior bargaining position because of her lack of
information or because of lesser bargaining skills? Would her
position be stronger if she had been referred to a legal
advocate?
The process to which A is referred to will make a great
deal of difference in the outcome. If she is referred to a
local tenant organization she will get one type of solution.
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If she is referred to a mediation center, she may get
another. If she is referred to legal services, she may get
yet another. If she could afford to have a private attorney,
she might get an entirely different solution.
Clearly there are many pressures on a person deciding
what process would be the most effective for resolving a
particular dispute. A court administrator in Minnesota asked
what the ideal professional background would be for a
Multidoor intake specialist. In Washington, D.C., I asked
this question of one of the Multidoor project evaluators at
the Institute for Social Analysis and, I received the
following tongue in cheek response: "A person with a doctorate
in psychology, a degree in law, and a load of experience in
social work."
In addition to the pressure to be nearly this
well-informed and to make decisions wisely there are a variety
of other institutional pressures on the intake worker, who is
in some cases a volunteer. Both the literature on
institutionalizing social programs (Beneviste, 1977, Hummel,
1977, Williams and Elmore, 1976, Wilson, 1967) and interviews
with practitioners identified three major pressures: the
tendency to act on personal bias, bureaucratic pressures, and
pressures resulting from competition between "doors." These
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pressures on the intake worker are discussed below. The
reader should keep in mind that these issues about intake are
not being raised to suggest that the intake and referral
concept is impossibly difficult or inherently biased. The
Multidoor Courthouse is a flexible concept in which an intake
and referral process can be designed to meet particular needs,
and what is being suggested here is that careful planning can
overcome the problems surrounding intake.
Personal bias is a well recognized but difficult problem
in an institution's decisionmaking. (Bateman, 1983) One of
the people who is training intake workers for the Multidoor
pilot projects related his experience in conducting a
particular training session. The people that he was training
had already had some experience as intake workers in referral
programs. When a hypothetical case was presented to a group
of these trainees, however, four entirely different responses
were given. Each one said that his response was based on a
"gut reaction." One such response was "Well it was a young
person and I figured that they would like mediation better."
The extensive and ongoing training that is being done
with Multidoor intake workers should help to eliminate this
kind of response, but the impulse to react in a simple
non-analytical manner, based on past patterns of prejudice
runs deep. It is common knowledge that age, class, sex, and
racial bias play powerful roles that affect our decision
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making. Consider, for example, the implications of the
stereotype that women like to resolve things peacefully, while
men like a good fight.
A related concern lies with the institutional pressures
that bureaucracy places on an intake worker. In an article by
Richard Weatherly about implementing social programs several
different factors are identified that may act on the "front
line" worker causing him or her to act in ways which adversely
affect the client. (Weatherly, 1980) Overload is an obvious
bureaucratic pressure, and one that carries with it large
risks. Having too many cases to handle could turn an
otherwise principled decision maker into a mechanical decision
maker. When this means the difference between an intake
worker accurately identifying a constitutional claim and
recommending a short mediation process for the same client,
the dangers are clear.
A similar fact of life in bureaucracies is "limited
resources." (Lipsky, 1980) The implications of limited
resources were made clear to me in an interview with a
thoughtful court administrator in Minnesota. She expressed
concern that a "just adequate" budget for intake personnel for
one year might well mean a 30% cut in budget for the next year
and the loss of professional intake workers. She pointed out
that replacing these workers with volunteers might mean that
the nature and quality of the services provided would be
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entirely different. Although volunteers might be extremely
dedicated and effective, they lack the professional expertise
that could make them consistent, objective decision makers.
In addition to personal bias and pressures resulting from
working in a bureaucracy, there are also pressures on an
intake worker stemming from "competition among doors." An
intake worker who is working directly in a courthouse may be
put in the position of having to choose between referring a
person to two entirely appropriate programs, one inside the
courthouse and one in the community. The director of a large
and influential community based dispute resolution program in
Washington, D.C. commented on this problem "I think that
court-based 'doors' may eventually pre-empt the existing
dispute resolution organizations. I see them competing for
funds, volunteers, and publicity."
Section I presented some of the social and intellectual
history behind the development of the Multidoor Courthouse.
Section II posed some of the theoretical and practical
problems associated with providing effective dispute
resolution in this way. Section III presents the reader with
descriptions of the three Multidoor pilot projects, examining
the ways in which they are dealing with these issues and
adapting to their differing environments.
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In the early '80s the leadership of the American Bar
Association (ABA) began to promote the idea of developing
experimental Multidoor Courthouses as pilot projects. Through
interviews, I learned that David Brink and Ronald Olson of the
ABA were especially instrumental in gathering support for the
idea, and that Professor Daniel McGillis of Harvard University
was hired to write a proposal for the development of pilot
projects. (Professor McGillis was chosen in part for his
experience in analyzing the Neighborhood Justice Centers for
the Department of Justice.)
When McGillis' design of the pilot project was approved
by the Board of Governors of the ABA, a competition was held
in which cities submitted proposals for the development of a
Multidoor Courthouse in their regions. The sites selected
would then be given technical assistance by the ABA in
developing their own projects. Tulsa and Houston were chosen
out of a group of ten finalists, which included Minnesota.
Later, it was decided that a third site would be added, and
Washington, D.C. was chosen.
Funding for each individual site was to come from grants,
loans, local fund raising and in some cases regional
legislative appropriations. Major sources of the grants and
loans were the Culpepper and Hewlett Foundations and
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additional grants were given to each site by the National
Institute for Dispute Resolution (NIDR). The Washington, D.C.
project also received a grant from the Meyer Foundation.
The ABA's Special Committee for Alternative Dispute
Resolution acting in conjunction with the Institute for Social
Analysis provided technical assistance to the projects on
training, planning, and evaluation. The Special Committee's
efforts were supported by the Hewlett and Culpepper
Foundation, as well as a grant from NIDR and allocations from
the ABA. A grant from the National Institute for Justice
funds the Institute for Social Analysis's research and
evaluation activities. (American Bar Association, 1984)
The general plan that was adopted by the ABA Board of
Governors includes three phases. In the initial phase (8
months) projects would create diagnostic intake services and
standardized procedures to refer complaints to existing or
improved dispute resolution processes in each jurisdiction.
Ongoing technical assistance and assessment would be provided
throughout the initial phase.
Based on the research and assessment of the first phase,
in the second phase (12 months) a specific plan to improve
dispute resolution services would be developed for each site.
Several approaches would be possible: new services or "doors"
could be created; existing services might be expanded or
- 28 -
improved; or some services would be consolidated to provide
for more efficient resolution of disputes.
In the final phase (6 months) an outside organization
would evaluate the Multidoor Dispute Resolution Centers to
determine their effectiveness as models for resolving
disputes. A final report would be distributed throughout the
dispute resolution "community," including state and local bar
associations, court systems, and citizen organizations.
Consideration would be given to developing a model that could
be replicated in other jurisdictions.
The Tjot PJpiectq
Below are general descriptions of the three Multidoor
sites. Information was taken from original plans of February,
1984 and my interviews, so that details may have changed as
implementation has begun.
1. Daist rigqt__oLCo pbi
Phase I of this pilot project, which began in September
of 1984 involves the coordination of three major intake and
referral points. The Citizen Complaint Center and Lawyers'
Referral and Information Service -- projects which were
already in operation -- serve as two of the intake points. A
third intake and referral point was created in the Superior
Court as part of Phase I, and was opened in January, 1985.
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The intake and referral effort is operated by staff
members and volunteers and supervised by professionals.
Training in interviewing skills, case diagnosis and referral
techniques is being provided to all participants. The project
has developed a referral manual, including all existing legal,
social service, and dispute settlement programs in the area.
Cases will be referred to a wide variety of dispute
processing forums. Two existing non-litigation alternatives
are to be expanded as part of Phase I. The first is the
Court's Voluntary Civil Arbitration Program. The other
existing forum which will be expanded is mediation at the
Citizen's Complaint Center.
Other programs are being considered under Phase II.
(Finkelstein, 1984) They include an experiment with
"accelerated resolution of major civil disputes." In this
experiment two Superior Court judges would be asked to try a
number of alternative ways of resolving disputes. They might
try setting up a summary jury or allow parties to present
their evidence to a neutral expert for a pretrial assessment.
Serious consideration is also being given to establishing a
mandatory arbitration program in the D.C. Superior Court.
Other proposals are to set up a Public Advocates Office, an
Ombusdman's office, and an Office of Public Mediation on an
experimental basis.
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Finally, mediation of minor criminal and delinquency
matters is being considered. Court officials would set up
procedures under the auspice of the U.S. Attorney to ensure
that certain types of cases are sent to mediation on a regular
basis. It is anticipated that many shoplifting and vandalism
cases and minor neighborhood assaults and disputes would be
successfully handled through mediation.
The project will operate for 18 months as a test of
dispute screening, diagnosis and referral mechanisms. The
total budget for the period is $353,143 and includes expenses
for personnel, supplies and equipment, training, technical
assistance and assessment. The ABA and National Institute of
Justice have committed $89,260 for the technical assistance
and assessment of the program. Other funding is to be
provided by the Culpepper and Meyer Foundations with an
additional grant by NIDR. Local funding will provide the
first $33,184.
2. T ul9p
The Tulsa Multidoor project, which is housed in the Tulsa
Citizens' Complaint Center, officially opened in April, 1984.
At the current time, there are three intake points to the
Tulsa Complaint Center. The central intake point is the
municipal courthouse and is called the Police/Prosecutor
Complaint Office. Another intake point in Tulsa is Channel
2's Troubleshooter program, an action line operated by a local
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TV station. The third intake point is the local Better
Business Bureau (BBB). The majority of the people bringing
cases to the Complaint Center office are walk-ins, referred by
court personnel or police officers in the field or
courthouse. As of the end of May 1984, approximately 200
cases had been handled by the courthouse office involving
primarily assault, harassment, property damages, and other
minor criminal matters. The vast majority of case are
referred from the Citizen's Complaint Center to the
prosecutor's office.
Project Early Settlement, a mediation and arbitration
program, is also a recipient of referrals from the screening
centers. The project is known nationwide for its dispute
settlement efforts and currently has approximately 130 trained
mediators who handle 1,200 cases per year. The program is
suitable to mediate small claims disputes, minor criminal
matters, domestic relations cases, restitution issues
associated with the Municipal Court traffic violation cases,
automotive warranty disputes (in conjunction with the local
BBB) and related matters.
Other doors that will receive referrals include existing
social service agencies that handle housing issues, consumer
matters, mental health services, family counseling, assistance
to the elderly and related functions.
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A partial assessment of Phase I in Tulsa has revealed the
desirability of adding new "doors" or shoring up existing
ones. (Simonson, 1983) Included in the recommendations are
the need for an arbitration program. It has also been
recognized that improvement can be made in the way consumer
disputes are handled, as there are currently deficiencies in
the processing of these cases, in the Center's accountability,
and in the identification of appropriate forums. Discussions
are underway with the Attorney General to address all the
problems noted in the assessment -- in particular, their
processing of consumer disputes.
Funding for the Tulsa Project is provided by a loan from
the Hewlett Foundation, a grant from NIDR, the Oklahoma Bar
Foundation, the Tulsa County Bar Foundation and 27 local
corporations, as well as local law firms.
3. HamsL~_tapn
The Alternative Disptue Resolution Committee of the
Houston Bar Association will direct the Houston-Harris County
Multidoor Center. This committee will serve as the central
clearinghouse for the multidoor program and will coordinate
all aspects of the county-wide dispute resolution system.
Included in this system will be several dispute
settlement services or doors: mediation; conciliation;
arbitration; minitrials; community conflict resolution;
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prisoner mediation and legal aid.
In addition, formal justice system doors will be
available through liaison with the county and district courts;
justices of the peace and municipal courts; and the offices of
the city, county, and district attorney. The multidoor
program will also refer citizens to related "doors" such as
mental health and housing services, and programs to assist the
victims of domestic abuse and violence.
The central intake and referral service for the mediation
and conciliation will be located at the Neighborhood Justice
Center in Houston's Harris County Criminal Courts Building.
In addition to funding from the ABA and NIJ, State
legislation providing funding for dispute resolution is
expected to yield a minimum of $174,210 toward the program,
leaving a balance of $181,610 (from a total of $445,080) to be
raised for completion of Phase I.
* * * *
At each site the development of budgets for phases II and
III is contingent upon the results of the initial assessment.
During Phase Three outside evaluators will determine the
effectiveness of the Multidoor Dispute Resolution Centers as
models for resolving disputes. They will ask important
questions such as, has it been possible to match an
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individual's problem with an appropriate dispute resolution
process? If so, was the process chosen "effective"? What new
processes or doors could lead to more effective resolution of
disputes?
It is clear from the descriptions of the three pilot
projects that, although each has grown out of a central
Multidoor Courthouse idea, each is evolving in its own way.
Intake and referral are central to each program, although in
Houston there is one dominant intake center, in the District
of Columbia there are three, and in Tulsa, three. In Tulsa
and Houston the local bar associations are administrators of
the programs, but in the District of Columbia it is the
Superior Court that is the administrative body. Funding has
been pursued differently in each location, with legislatures
and city governments playing a significant role in some cases
and none in others. The original idea grows differently in
each environment, with its unique social, political, economic
and institutional characteristics. Chapter Two provides an
overview of the Minnesota dispute resolution environment, and
the particular characteristics which are likely to influence
the growth of a Multidoor Courthouse.
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CHAPTEP TWO: hISTORY AND CURRENT STATUS OF
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN MINNESOTA
I1. A&n_Qvg vijgV ofLj;JLtl Mjg;p tU teplt. i, v oni eg
In 1981, Minnesota became the second state, after New
York, to appropriate state money for alternative dispute
resolution (ADR) programs. (Byrne, 1984) One hundred thousand
dollars was committed to fund two pilot dispute resolution
programs: the Dispute Resolution Program in Ramsey County and
the St. Louis Park Juvenile Mediation Project. The funding of
the two community dispute settlement programs sparked
considerable interest in ADR. The St. Louis Park Juvenile
Mediation Project, for example, was later folded into a larger
effort, the Mediation Center. The Mediation Center sought and
received foundation and bar association money and has assisted
several Hennepin County communities in establishing dispute
settlement centers. Overall, the growth in dispute resolution
programs has been so great that the Minnesota State Bar
Association (MSBA) has developed a D
DRe~so1t~ip froqrAps which now lists and describes
forty public and private organizations. (MSBA, 1984)
Data for this section have been derived from the Bar
Association pir-eczt-oLy, from interviews, and from a paper on
Alternative Dispute Resolution Programs in Minnesota provided
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by the Minnesota State Planning Agency. (Byrne, 1984)
For the purposes of this paper, I will consider only
programs that are administered by the government to be
"public" programs; all other programs will be considered
"private" programs, even though some may receive partial
public funding or serve a public function.
Private dispute resolution organizations include
professional organizations, community organizations, religious
based organizations, and organizations based in educational,
hospital, and mental health institutions. Public dispute
resolution programs can be divided into court based programs
and non court based programs. The private dispute resolution
programs will be described first and then the public
programs.
There are approximately eleven private pitezgiLnci
organizations that provide dispute resolution services in
Minnesota. These include both lawyers and mental health
professionals. Typically these organizations offer services
in the areas of domestic violence and private divorce
mediations, with much of their funding coming from client
fees. (MSBA, 1984) It is likely that there are many more
professional organizations providing these kinds of services,
but they have either not categorized themselves as ADR
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providers or have not made their way to the MSBA Pirjjctsjry.
A second group of private professional organizations do
not provide services, but represent specific groups of
professionals. These include regional bar associations,
mental health associations, the Society for Professionals in
Dispute Resolution (SPIDR), the American Arbitration
Association (AAA), and the Minnesota Council of Family
Mediators. (MSBA, 1984)
mojmuni.ty dispute resolution organizations are also
private organizations in the sense that they are not supported
totally by public funds. Most programs that identify
themselves as community programs receive funding from a
variety of sources. Typically a majority of the funding comes
from foundations, with some government funding from the courts
or from state or municipally legislated appropriations.
(MSBA, 1984) In fact, these community programs tend to be both
public and private, and they are able to play a unique role in
dispute resolution planning in Minnesota. They will be
referred to here as Community Dispute Resolution Programs
(CDR).
In 1984, a non-legislated source of funding became
available for CDR programs. Presently there is a large sum of
money generated from interest in lawyers' trust accounts
(IOLTA). Administered by the IOLTA committee, under the aegis
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of the state's Supreme Court, this grant money was recently
made available to ADR programs. The funds were distributed to
three CDR programs in the state. Of twenty-two operating
IOLTA funds in the country, Minnesota's was the first to fund
ADR programs. (Byrne, 1984)
Most CDR programs deal with neighborhood problems,
landlord/tenant problems, juvenile problems, consumer
problems, employer/employee relations, and some commercial
problems. While each program cultivates its own referral
sources, in general programs tend to attract some clients by
word of mouth and receive referrals from police, legal
services, community organizations, social services agencies,
health care professionals, public officials, and private
attorneys. (MSBA, 1984)
Other private dispute resolution programs include
church-based, college-based, and hospital-based programs. The
two church programs offer a wide variety of services similar
to the community programs and are funded by the churches,
through foundations, and by individual fees. The two private
college programs listed in the Minnesota ADR Pi eQqsr are
funded out of their college budgets and focus on
student-related disputes. In addition, mediation services are
provided in a private hospital and a mental health center.
(MSBA, 1984)
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Finally, many of the private organizations in Minnesota
provide training for their own staff and volunteers and for
outside organizations. When in-house training is not
available training may come from national professional dispute
resolution groups or from local practitioners. Both the
Mediation Center and the Dispute Resolution Center have been
involved in developing and conducting a training program for
county welfare units who expressed an interest in using
mediation to resolve family disputes and child custody
disputes. The Hawthorne Area Neighborhood Dispute Settlement
Program conducts training for those neighborhoods interested
in the Community Boards model for dispute resolution.
Both Hamline and William Mitchell Schools of Law have
expressed an interest in receiving information and training in
the area of ADR, with the intention of eventually building it
into their curricula. The University of Minnesota's Law
School already has a class on ADR. With more than thirty
courses in dispute resolution in various departments at the
University, faculty and administration are drawing the various
departments together to collaborate in opening a Conflict
Analysis Center. I have learned through extensive interviews
with Dr. Thomas Fuitak that the Conflict Analysis Center will
conduct research and be involved in curriculum development in
the area of negotiation. While the final form of the Conflict
Analysis Center is still being shaped, seminars and workshops
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have already gotten underway.
P-ub~c.Qx~Anizti ana
Among the early non-court-based programs was the consumer
dispute resolution provided by the Consumer Affairs Division
of the Attorney General's Office. Other more recent
non-court-based programs include the Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service, which provides both mediation and
arbitration for labor/management disputes; the Minnesota
Bureau of Mediation Services which provides services for
labor/management disputes and for employer/employee disputes;
and the city-attorney-based mediation program which handles
neighborhood and domestic relations mediation. (MSBA, 1984)
In 1983 an Alternative Dispute Resolution Program was
created in the State Planning office. (Byrne, 1984) Its
purpose was to conduct research and to guide initial
experimental pilot efforts to make ADR processes available for
use both within the state government and in the state
generally. Based on recommendations of Program staff members,
legislation was passed in 1983 mandating a legislative
commission to study the feasibility of making ADR processes
available as alternatives to the sometimes lengthy and costly
contested case hearings conducted by the Office of
Administrative Hearings. Two state agencies were selected to
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be pilot projects for the study, and training in mediation was
conducted for those Administrative Law Judges who would serve
as neutral mediators in the contested cases referred from
those agencies. Efforts to encourage the use of negotiated
rule-making by state agencies has also been initiated, with
the goal of cutting down on the time that agencies spend in
regulatory hearings. The ADR program in the State Planning
Office has also brought together a task force comprised of
leaders in the public and private sector, involved with
environmental matters, to explore the use of ADR in
environmental disputes and to make recommendations to the
Governor.
The feasibility of developing a Statewide Office for
Conflict Management is currently being explored. Funded by an
appropriation of $250,000, the program would be designed to
generate and share information about alternative dispute
resolution; to plan and make available dispute resolution
processes to be used by state government and in disputes
involving the state; and to develop the capacity to train
third party neutrals. Partial funding for this project has
already been provided by a grant from the National Institute
for Dispute Resolution.
Aourt-Bfe -orast
A number of court-based programs are either in existence
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or now being developed. Court-based programs are in a sense a
foreshadowing of the original Multidoor Courthouse concept in
that they are available directly in a courthouse or in a court
annexed program.
Through interviews with state and county court
administrators, I learned that legislation has been enacted in
Minnesota which will enable the District, County, and
Municipal Courts to set up arbitration programs. The Courts
will be able to recommend rules of procedure, which will be
submitted to the Supreme Court for approval. A mandatory
nonbinding arbitration program has already been approved for
funding in Hennepin County, and the proposed procedural rules
have been ratified by the Supreme Court. All civil cases of
up to $50,000 will be referred to arbitration panels composed
of lawyers with at least five years of experience. A similar
program is being considered in Ramsey County.
Other court sponsored alternative dispute resolution
programs include voluntary mediation in family court and a
variety of referrals to mediation programs that fall loosely
within the structure of the criminal justice system (and
therefore might be considered court related).
9&A-EIIJ4_e,Si"lA~tijpo
The 1984 legislative session passed several bills having
to do with ADR. (Byrne, 1984) First, legislation creating a
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uniform Community Dispute Settlement Centers Program (modeled
after New York's program) was passed. The program was put in
the state court administrator's office where operational
guidelines for community dispute resolution centers were
created through a judicial planning committee. These
guidelines contain certification standards with which centers
must comply in order to be eligible for state appropriated
funding. Included in the standards' are training standards,
reporting requirements, and limitations on what kind of
conflicts can be mediated in community centers. A second part
of this legislation is now being proposed, through which
$200,000 would be appropriated to provide up to 50% of the
operating costs of certified programs.
Second, the Civil Mediation Act was also passed. It
addresses the legal barriers to mediation, i.e., liability,
confidentiality, use of subpoenas, etc. The Bar Association's
Committee on Methods for Non-judicial Resolution of Disputes
was actively involved in drafting and refining this
legislation.
Third, in recognition of the need to help fund the
growing number of community dispute settlement programs, the
legislature amended the Legal Aid Funding formula so that
qualified community ADR programs became eligible, along with
other legal aid programs, for 15% of money generated from the
increased fees on civil filings.
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I I. The TlitigAl Anlt
Because of this strong early effort at developing ADR in
Minnesota, the design of the Multidoor Courthouse will need to
reflect the needs and interests of many ADR programs. The
design process will be heavily impacted by three aspects of
the Minnesota political and social landscape:
- a political and social culture that values decentraliza-
tion, public participation, and consensual decision-
making
- the attitudes of local service providers about issues
central to the development of a Multidoor Courthouse
such as intake and referral.
- an existing base of community organizations with diverse
interests and the political and economic resources to
pursue them effectively.
In order to understand better these conditions that
underlie the development of alternative dispute resolution
movement in Minnesota, I conducted informal interviews with a
variety of people concerned with dispute resolution. These
included interviews with directors of three community
organizations, three court administrators, a state planner,
private attorneys, educators, legal services representatives,
and a representatives of the Minnesota Bar Association. From
these interviews, I have drawn observations about ADR planning
and design of a MDC in particular.
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People speak about Minnesota as having a unique political
and social structure. "Minnesotans don't like centralized
anything," was one of the first reactions I received to the
idea of a Multidoor Courthouse. An urban policy analyst
commented, "If the neighborhoods don't like it, it won't go."
An article about Health Maintenance Organizations talked about
the spirit of consensus in Minnesota being pervasive from the
neighborhoods all the way up to the largest corporations.
(Inglehart, 1984)
Minnesota is a diverse and complex environment for
dispute resolution, with creativity and innovation equally
flourishing in the community, public, and private sectors. It
is an environment in which neighborhoods are politically
active and in which community programs continue to evolve. It
is an environment in which the state is planning an Office of
Conflict Management, in which the legislature has funded and
continues to consider funding programs and pilot projects, and
in which the courts are actively involved in creating
alternative programs. Private foundations extensively fund a
wide variety of programs, private dispute resolution services
are budding, and innovative funding alternatives are being
created. In addition, the University is responding to the
need for conflict analysis and research.
To the extent that this level of activity may signal
creativity and innovation, it may also make coordination of
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these efforts difficult, especially because, "Minnesotans
don't like centralized anything." It also complicates the
question of who might control a Multidoor Courthouse. There
are enough competing interests in Minnesota's dispute
resolution community that a number of serious questions need
to be raised: What group is most capable of making changes
within the court system? What is the most experienced dispute
resolution group? Who best understands the social networks
and how they operate for the benefit of citizens? Who has the
most influence over funding sources?
In an ideal world, decisions about a Multidoor Court
would be made after a consideration of all the interests and a
search for a design that would serve the greatest variety of
needs in the most equitable way. More likely, however, a
prominent judge or a community innovator, or a bar association
would step forward and say "We want a Multidoor Courthouse and
we will develop it under the auspices of our own
organization." If they are successful, control, at least
initially, will have gone to the organization which has spoken
most loudly, acted most quickly, and been most able to gather
the resources to move ahead.
The critical question that faces Multidoor Courthouse
planners in Minnesota, then, becomes one of accountability.
By the time that a region has gone through the process of
having one interest group take control, after powerful
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financial backers have invested in the concept, after laws
regulating the venture have been created and public funds
allocated or not allocated, and after other interest groups
oppose the existing power holders and try to gain influence
over the institution, does the Multidoor Courthouse have
anything to do with "effective" dispute processing?
The answer is that effective resolution of disputes in a
Multidoor Courthouse is dependent upon a wide variety of
options being available to a citizen with a problem, and a
system of intake which is capable of matching the problem to
the proper forum. Outside influences such as the ones
mentioned above all have the potential to lead the Multidoor
Courthouse away from "effective" dispute processing. For
example, control by one interest group such as a bar
association or mental health association may influence the
decisions of intake workers toward professional rather than
lay dispute resolution processes. Control by a court system
may place too much emphasis on cost effectiveness and may be
biased toward court-based programs. The danger that any of
the outside influences will significantly impinge upon the
effective resolution of disputes is what creates the argument
for a planning process which comes as close as possible to
"the ideal world" scenario described previously. In this
planning process decisions of control would be made after a
consideration of all of the interests and after an exploration
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of the possible management systems that would best serve the
mutually agreed upon interests of the parties involved. Such
a planning process is described in Chapter Three.
One way of reducing the initial problems associated with
administrative control would be to place the process of
choosing an appropriate administrator in a mutually
agreed-upon forum in which no one group has control. A
variety of parties have expressed the view that the Conflict
Analysis Center would act as such a neutral forum. I would
therefore suggest that it be considered as an initial forum in
which to draw together parties for a comprehensive planning
process.
Once a mutually agreed-upon forum is selected for
exploring the possibility of developing a Multidoor
Courthouse, the work of identifying the community's dispute
resolution needs can begin. Although those ends cannot be
precisely predicted, there seem to be a variety of issues
which would be of general importance to participants. These
issues include intake, referral, centralization, funding, and
regulation. Several of these are touched upon here to
illustrate the diversity of views and the need for planning.
The intake and referral process, an integral part of the
Multidoor concept, is complex and a probable source of
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confusion. In order for ADR programs to arrive at a common
conceptualization of an intake and referral process, their
differing needs will have to be considered, and then an intake
and referral process designed to fit those needs. The views
of a variety of dispute resolution programs on intake and
referral are explored below.
The director of a prominent community dispute resolution
center made the following observations: "We can't be efficient
until we get out of the business of recruiting business." In
his conceptualization of the MDC, intake would be centralized
and sources of referral would be pursued by a central
administration. His organization would then be freed to do
work which he would consider to be more valuable.
The director of another prominent dispute resolution
center, however, has a very different conceptualization of the
intake and referral process. He expressed the following
concern: "How can one reduce the possibility, with centralized
intake, of a citizen making an uninformed choice about the
most appropriate forum for his or her dispute?" He felt that
it was because of his intake workers' great familiarity with
tenant/landlord issues that they were able to educate a person
about his or her options -- mediation, legal services, a
private attorney, the possibility of getting advice from the
tenants' union, or self-help. Intake at his center, he
pointed out, was done by paid professional staff, not
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volunteers. He expressed the concern that centralized intake
workers could not be familiar with all the issues and
resources in dispute resolution. He suggested that cases
ought to start at the community centers that are already doing
a good job of intake, and then be referred to a central intake
worker only if the problem could not be handled at the
community centers.
As was discussed in Chapter One, one of the features of
the original Multidoor Courthouse concept was the kind of
centralized intake service located in a courthouse that this
Director fears will not be effective. Clearly this kind of
centralization has advantages and disadvantages. The
advantages include the ability to refer clients to a broad
range of services which include but are not limited to ADR
processes. A citizen coming to an individual ADR center might
be offered only the particular process in which that center
specializes without regard for whether legal advocacy, some
public or private social service, or self-help might be more
appropriate.
The disadvantages of centralized intake include the
possibility that intake workers will not be able to
distinguish appropriately between types of cases, because to
do so would require knowledge of too many specialized areas of
law and social work. Another problem is that centralized
intake may have the effect of drawing people away from
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neighborhood based programs.
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Paklilntmeet -GPomp-
1 . N-e-ighbokhltod SLgmi ti
For a project like the Hawthorne Area Neighborhood
Dispute Settlement Program (HANDS) it is crucial that the
neighborhood organization remain the central intake point.
The program offers resolution of neighborhood disputes using a
board of citizen mediators, which is sometimes referred to as
a "Community Board." The Board is made up of four or five
neighborhood members selected from a larger group of trained
citizen mediators who meet together in order to mediate the
problems of neighbors. The Board in the Hawthorne area is
intentionally multiracial and serves not only to help the
disputants resolve their particular problems, but also to act
as a peer group and educational forum to help bring about
neighborhood cohesiveness. There are currently two such
programs using the Community Boards model (which was derived
from the San Francisco Community Boards Program), and there
are several more neighborhoods that are looking to develop
similar programs. I spent a considerable amount of time
interviewing in person the director of the HANDS program, an
educator specializing in neighborhood politics, and the
president of the San Francisco Community Boards program. It
is the contention of these people that a centralized intake
and referral process would draw people away from the
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neighborhoods to a downtown office, a process they fear would
be destructive of neighborhood cohesiveness.
A prominent dispute resolution innovator in Minnesota and
the educator specializing in neighborhood politics both
stressed that it is important for Multidoor Court planners to
consider the interests of neighborhood groups. The
consequences of not gaining neighborhood support may mean that
representatives in government will perceive that proponents of
ADR are not treating the neighborhoods fairly. This could
lead to fewer votes for ADR funding in general and a labelling
of ADR as "anti- neighborhood."
Neighborhood programs like HANDS, however, see themselves
as being separate from the traditional justice system and may
not want to participate in large scale ADR planning. I make
the argument here that both their own survival and a
responsibility to induce ADR planners to consider the
significance of planning on the neighborhood level compel
neighborhood programs to participate in Multidoor Courthouse
planning. In the face of centralized intake and referral,
neighborhood programs have the opportunity to design an intake
and referral process that will increase neighborhood
cohesiveness rather than having it destroyed by competition.
Even without a Multidoor Courthouse, there is incentive
for neighborhood groups to become more involved in
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decision-making that affects community dispute resolution
centers. In Minnesota, for example, two or three
non-neighborhood Community Dispute Resolution programs have
been heavily funded by the Supreme Court, IOLTA and private
funders. Publicity, prominence, and a large base of referrals
may eventually turn these centers into large, court-associated
intake centers, posing some of the same problems to
neighborhood programs (i.e., competition for funding,
referrals and publicity) as a centralized Multidoor
Courthouse.
Another reason for neighborhood programs to participate
in a larger planning process relates to their funding. One of
the problems that programs like HANDS face is that funders
have traditionally evaluated programs on the basis of
AnitjtitE of case referrals. While this criterion may be
relatively easy to determine, it may not be determinative of
the kind of gjity which is valuable to the users of
neighborhood programs. It was suggested by Raymond Schonholtz
that capacity, skill building, neighborhood cohesion, range
and quality of case and hearing work, and diversity among
trained volunteers are the appropriate standards for measuring
the performance of community boards. (Shonholtz, 1984)
Without participation in ADR planning, these standards are not
likely to be adopted.
A final motivation for participation in decisions about
- 55 -
the Multidoor comes from the State. Proposed legislation in
Minnesota would provide funding to dispute resolution centers
that would comply with the state's operational guidelines.
When the operational guidelines were being formed,
neighborhood organizations were not represented, and these
guidelines well may have a potentially harmful effect on
neighborhood programs. Future decisions about regulation and
funding will be of great importance to neighborhood programs
and participation in a planning process is one way to insure
their representation. The ultimate incentive for neighborhood
programs to be involved in dispute resolution planning is that
not to do so may eventually mean being legislated out of
existence or having to compete with more highly funded or
prominent programs.
2. Eubicj-ILragt -Qxpa
There are a variety of other community groups (referred
to here as public interest groups) whose primary concern is
not ADR, but who also should be encouraged to participate in a
MDC planning process. Their involvement is important both
because the issues they are involved with are important to ADR
providers and because those organizations and the causes that
they represent stand to be harmed if they are not involved.
One of the most politically significant groups is
composed of women concerned about violence against women.
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Advocates for the rights of battered women and women in
general have been critical of mediation programs, because of
their tendency to put women in a position in which they are
bargaining with a power disadvantage. I learned from
interviews with court administrators in both Washington, D.C.
and Minnesota that where violence has been committed against
women, there is a general consensus that their cases ought to
go to the prosecutor rather than the mediator. The rights of
low income women are also thought to be in jeopardy in
mediation, where women's economic status and bargaining skills
could put them at a disadvantage.
In Minnesota, women demonstrated their political
influence during the creation of operational guidelines for a
Community Dispute Resolution Centers, by limiting the kinds of
disputes (e.g., cases involving physical violence) that can be
resolved by mediation.
Despite deep concerns about the role of ADR in resolving
problems of violence against women, women's groups have
volunteered to work with neighborhood programs like HANDS in
order to determine what kinds of cases should go to court and
which might be appropriately mediated. This is a role that
women's groups have been unwilling to play in the past with
highly bureaucratic and hierarchial organizations. This
willingness to establish working relationships between already
existing community groups has important implications for an
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ADR planning process. It demonstrates that, on the community
level, where networks and alliances can be established between
similarly situated programs, there is the potential for
building the kind of neighborhood cohesiveness that is the
goal of many community organizations. I believe that this
also indicates that much of the work of determining what is an
"effective" process for resolving a particular dispute will
have to be worked out on a neighborhood level by the people
who confront these issues every day.
This observation has been borne out by interviews with
other groups as well. Legal Service agencies are another
group that in general is more than cautious about the use of
mediation for cases involving the rights of low income
people. (Janes, 1984 and Minnesota Legal Services Coalition,
1984) Legal Service providers, like those who are concerned
with the rights of women, also believe that insufficient
resources and inadequate bargaining skills will have negative
impact, on low income people who go into mediation without an
advocate. In addition, legal services organizations see ADR
as a threat because they are receiving pressure from the
conservative Legal Services Corporation to increase their
budgets for ADR, while decreasing their advocacy budgets.
While there are reasons for Legal Service organizations
to be suspicious of ADR, an extensive interview with a
director of a Legal Service agency revealed to me their
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underlying dilemma. He and his colleagues feel that mediation
would be appropriate in many cases, but what they want is
power to decide what cases would be mediated. Such an
arrangement was discussed in an interview with a mediation
program director who had a close working relationship with a
legal services office. She said that they had worked out a
way of determining when a case needed advocacy, when mediation
was appropriate, or when some combination was valuable.
This example once again confirms the observation that
groups who are concerned about the abuse of ADR processes seem
willing to coordinate with ADR programs, when their
relationships arise out of carefully constructed networks
rather than hierarchical bureaucracies. Other groups that
appear to fit this model are those concerned with consumer
issues, civil rights and environmental issues.
Whereas in the three Multidoor pilot projects either the
courts or the bar associations have administered the projects,
it is not clear that those are the best options in Minnesota.
While control by one group may be effective in the short run,
the costs in the long run to the community of not building a
more representative and democratic administrative structure
for a Multidoor Courthouse may be great.
In Minnesota, where consensual decision-making and public
participation are an important part of the social culture, the
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advocates of the neighborhoods, women, low income people, and
consumers and environmentalists might naturally move toward a
participatory planning process with the representatives of a
full range of private and governmental groups. Such a process
would likely result in a more diverse and innovative
administrative structure than is being introduced in other
locations. Part Three describes some of the characteristics
of such a planning process.
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CHAPTER THREE: THE PLANNING PROCESS
As we have seen, the Multidoor Courthouse as conceived by
Frank Sander is not a rigid model to be replicated in any
setting. Rather, the concept is a flexible one that can be
adapted to the individual needs and social and political
structure of potential sites. In the paragraphs that follow I
outline a planning process for designing a Multidoor
Courthouse in one site -- Minnesota. The process reflects the
fact that, in this case, there is a culture that values
consensual decision making and public participation. Thus,
the process tries to involve the full range of existing
organizations concerned with dispute resolution -- including
community groups, the private sector, and state and local
government.
I. D~ggtlttf;q~a
The process I will describe draws on the experience of
several participatory community planning models. In
particular, it builds on the experiences of the Negotiated
Investment Strategy developed by the Kettering Foundation in
the mid '70's. The Negotiated Investment Strategy (NIS) was
developed in response to a need for fostering greater
communication between levels of government through carefully
structured bargaining sessions with the assistance of an
impartial mediator. The outcome, or the "negotiated strategy"
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is an implementation plan. (Warren, 1981)
The original NIS experiments took place in three cities:
St. Paul, Minnesota; Columbus, Ohio; and Gary, Indiana. In
St. Paul. and Gary, the focus was on complex redevelopment
projects requiring substantial resource commitments from
federal, local and private interests. In Columbus,
negotiations were focussed on improving day to day working
relations among state, local, and federal agencies. The
common focus of all three experiments was the coordination of
public and private investments of money and workpower, with
the hope of improving economic and social conditions in the
cities.
The concept was expanded in Malden, Massachusetts in
1984. Rather than negotiating exclusively between
government-related agencies, the Malden experiment involved
bringing together city government, local businesses, and
citizen representatives in order to address a wide variety of
community issues. As in the other experiments, three teams
were formed, but in Malden the teams were the city,
businesses, and citizens. Each team was asked to form an
agenda of community issues that they would like to see
addressed. The three teams then met in a negotiation session
with mediators who assisted them in deriving a single agenda.
Each issue was then explored and addressed by a committee made
up of at least one member from each team. These tripartite
- 62 -
committees were a key component of the planning process in
that they brought together people from the three different
teams and allowed each issue to be addressed from the
perspective of local government, the private sector, and
citizens' groups. (Glover, 1983)
What started out to be a dispute resolution process in
the original Kettering experiments was in Malden formed into a
creative planning process where new relationships were
developed and joint projects designed. While the Malden model
is an innovative application of participatory planning, it
does fall short of the ideal in several respects. The model
assumes that each team has equal bargaining power. Though the
use of mediators does help to promote equality, there are
still problems associated with bargaining power in a citizens'
team. First, there is the problem of how to represent diverse
interests. Representing too many interests may mean
representing none of the citizens' interests well. Another
associated problem is that the Malden model assumes that the
citizens' groups have previously established organization.
While other groups may have well defined structures, a
citizens' group is likely to be relatively unorganized, and
thus, they will likely have limited resources. Finally, there
may be no ongoing structure by which the citizens' group can
ensure that strategies developed in the planning process can
be implemented.
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The planning process I will design for Minnesota then,
will be very similar to that used in Malden, but will take
into account these problems of potential power imbalance. The
elements of the Malden experience I will use are the
following:
- the three teams of organizations
- the use of mediators or facilitators
- the use of committees to bring together members
from different teams
- the use of joint planning sessions to arrive
at a final implementation plan
The one new element I will recommend is that the team
made up of community based dispute resolution programs should
enter into a separate "pre-planning" process before any
coordinated planning with the other two teams would take
place. This addition seems to respond best to the thorny
problems surrounding the ability of community groups to
participate in this kind of process.
I I . Tb-e lPDnnQoQa
The process of planning for the multidoor courthouse in
Minnesota could consist of five phases:
- an organizing phase
- a "pre-planning" process
- an issue development phase
- a joint goal setting phase
- the implementation plan
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The initial stage of the planning process should be the
hiring of a project coordinator, who would be responsible for
organizing teams, making rules, and generating funding. A
major job of the coordinator would be to identify key
stakeholders and to make certain that they are all represented
when the teams are organized. The coordinator would work in
conjunction with the Conflict Analysis Center at the
University of Minnesota.
E -t l J o
In Minnesota the pre-planning process must respond to the
fact that within the community there are organizations with
two very different sets of goals. The first group, which we
will call Community Mediation Programs, has a formal
relationship with the court system, from which they receive at
least some of their referrals. In general, they provide a
mediation service to individuals regardless of their
relationship to a particular neighborhood. The Mediation
Center and the St. Paul Dispute Resolution Center would be
examples of this kind of "mediation" program.
The second group we will call Community Boards Programs,
typified by the HANDS and West Bank Neighborhood programs.
The general goal of these programs is to use a panel or
"board" of community facilitators who can help neighborhood
members learn the skills they need to resolve their disputes
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in ways that build a stronger community. They differ from
"mediator" programs in that they work within a community
network which provides not just mediation but services such as
healthcare, day care, legal services, and job training.
During my interviews with both kinds of groups, there was
some agreement as to what a pre-planning process should
accomplish. Members of the "mediation" and the "Boards"
programs saw two goals as central:
1. To consolidate the interests of similarly situated
community based programs.
2. To establish a group of respresentatives that can act
as liasions with other teams in the planning process.
In addition, the Boards programs saw two additional
purposes for these initial meetings:
1. To establish a short-term financial resource base for
the purposes of planning and to develop a long-range financial
plan for the purposes of implementing new projects.
2. To coordinate interests with other community based
groups that are not thought of traditionally as being part of
the ADR movement, but who through the same networks
participate in community building (legal services,
tenant-landlord organizations, women's groups, etc.).
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These goals are part of a larger plan, which is being
created by Community Boards programs, which would lead to the
development of a center for training and for helping new
neighborhood programs get started.
The joint planning that would have to take place between
these two types of community based programs, if they are to
form a "team," does not mean integration of all of their
goals.
Instead, it should be an opportunity to explore what
could be gained by entering into a Multidoor planning process
and to explore what strategies can be taken to accomplish
individual and joint goals. Participants in the community
pre-planning process will be given a great deal of leeway to
decide how the pre-planning process will be designed and
carried out. They might do this by holding community
hearings, by having a series of formal meetings at which
issues are derived and committees are formed, or by a variety
of other approaches. Whichever process is chosen or developed
the coordinator of the MDC planning process will be available
to act as a resource for information and as a facilitator (if
they elect to have an outside facilitator). The major
responsibility of the coordinator in this phase will be to see
that the community groups emerge as a team with adequate
bargaining power.
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When this pre-planning process has been accomplished to
the satisfaction of the two types of community based groups,
the Community Team should be ready to enter into the Phase
Three of the process, with the private team and the government
team.
Ehs tcT-Me U l Peyg0oPAMqnt El1A g
In this phase the three teams begin meeting with each
other for a general introduction, setting of rules, and the
development of a time table. At this stage, too, the teams
need to select jointly a group of mediator/facilitators who
would be available for each team to help with inter- and
intra-team decision making. The teams will decide precisely
what role the mediator/facilitator will play throughout the
processes. Clearly, these mediators or facilitators should be
people who do not have a direct stake in the outcome of the
process. Since St. Paul was a site for the original NIS
experiment, it may be that mediator/facilitators form that
project would be logical candidates for these positions (or at
least they might be involved as consultants to the Multidoor
Planning Project).
Once these facilitators are chosen, each of the teams
should begin to create its own set of issues which it would
like to see discussed during the planning process. These
lists might include issues about the Multidoor Court such as
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intake and referral, ADR policy, funding, and administrative
structure. After each team generates its own list of issues,
a mediation session should take place in which representatives
of all three teams present their issues and agree to a list of
joint issues. This mediated session not only serves as a
means to create an agenda of mutually agreed-upon issues, but
also to begin to develop decision making skills within and
among the teams.
F~AEhs _Fur: - _o ltting
In this phase each issue derived in Phase Three becomes a
subject heading for a committee. The sample issues identified
above would generate an "Intake and Referral Committee," and a
"Financial Committee", among others. What is critical is that
each committee be made up of representatives from all three
teams. These committees, bringing together all three
perspectives, can begin generating a set of objectives and
recomemndations. For the Financial Committee, such a set of
objectives might include a detailed proposal for financing a
Multidoor administrative staff for the first three years; a
proposal to establish an ongoing committee for the development
of new funding alternatives; and guidelines for the equitable
distribution of legislated funding to community dispute
resolution centers. During this process the team
representatives would meet to discuss these committee
proposals, both for making suggestions for modification of the
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proposals and for sharing information so that committees are
able to keep in touch with each others' progress.
EhA. a--i- --- ThtPPI&metsat--1An
In this final phase of the planning process, the
recommendations of the individual committees are combined by
consensus through a series of mediated planning sessions. It
is during these critical sessions that final decisions would
be made about whether the Multidoor Courthouse should be in
one central location or in many locations, about whether
administrative control should come from one group or should be
jointly managed, and where the funding should come from. The
outcome of this series of mediated sessions will be an
implementation plan which could be handed over to whatever
organizations, existing or newly created, that would be
designated to carry out the plan.
III. AosnibDle-QRtgpf &
In this section, I have the opportunity to speculate
about the kinds of Multidoor Courthouses that might grow out
of this planning process. I do this partly to encourage
readers and potential planners to think creatively. Having
been in the unique position of interviewing a number of
remarkable people currently concerned about dispute resolution
and the Multidoor court, I feel that I also owe the reader
some of their ideas and my interpretations of them.
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Accepting for the purposes of this discussion the sense
of my interviewees that "Minnesotans don't like
_centralizedanything," I shy away from the idea that the
courthouse should be centralized, but still retain the concept
of "doors" and of comprehensive intake processes capable of
referring clients to more than one kind of dispute resolution
forum. Instead of visualizing one courthouse in the middle of
a region in Minnesota, I imagine that a whole region is a
"courthouse," and that citizens with a concern would enter the
courthouse through a "door" in their neighborhood. What they
are really entering is a community network, made accessible by
a sophisticated intake process and capable of meeting their
social and economic needs as well as their needs for dispute
resolution.
Entering a neighborhood door in this model, then, implies
more than gaining access to a dispute resolution process. The
intake workers in this neighborhood network recognize that
underlying many disputes are complex social and economic
problems, which if dealt with one at a time and not in
relation to one another, are likely to solve a person's
dispute only temporarily.
For example, in a particular neighborhood a variety of
disputes having to do with vandalism might come before a board
of community mediators or facilitators. On a case-by-case
basis the perpetrator and the victim may be dealt with
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effectively -- perhaps through restitution. By confronting
the same problem over and over again, however, the board and
other community organizations may recognize that there is a
need to deal more comprehensively with vandalism and to
establish both a "crime watch" program and a youth work
program.
Other situations are easy to imagine. Consider the kinds
of disputes that arise involving parents with small children
-- child abuse, complaints about noise, or nonpayment of child
support. Collectively these disputes might signal the need
for development of daycare centers and family counseling.
In a third example, a group of cases involving
withholding rent to landlords because repairs are not being
done may lead to a proposal for a tenant-owned maintenance
company. Under this arrangement, rents might be reduced in
exchange for maintenance work being done by the newly formed
company.
In all these cases, disputes that would in a traditional
court or mediation program be treated as individualized
problems, become the concerns of a community network. What I
am suggesting then, is that a Multidoor Dispute Resolution and
Planning Center in every neighborhood could link individual
disputants with others who have similar problems and with the
appropriate institutional resources. The "doors" in this
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neighborhood Multidoor Dispute Resolution and Planning Center
might contain labels like Mediator, community board, legal
services, community planning, community business development,
and community development bank. This kind of center would
also include a computer resource center and community meeting
space.
The structure and goals of such an organization should
address some of the concerns about justice discussed in
Chapter One. Those critics who are concerned with access to
justice (Nader, 1980) would support the processing of group
claims and the joint decision making between legal service
providers and ADR providers, made possible by this model.
This community Multidoor Center should also satisfy those
concerned with "community building," (Shonholtz, 1984) since
it does translate social problems into development projects,
and those who are concerned about developing separate justice
systems since it promotes neighborhood control. (Danzig,
1973) However, it is not clear that this model adequately
responds to Sander's question of how to provide "effective"
dispute resolution. In particular can it address the problem
of the "all-knowing intake worker," of disputes that extend
beyond neighborhood boundaries, or of problems that are too
complex or specialized for neighborhoods to handle?
The problem of how to manage intake effectively in this
kind of neighborhood center could be partially resolved by
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linkages between alternative dispute resolution techniques,
legal aid agencies, and other community oriented
organizations. Intake training could focus specifically on
community issues, taking advantage of the resources of all the
groups to develop a comprehensive protocol for intake workers
-- one that would help them determine the full range of
processes that might be appropriate for a particular
situation.
The second problem -- that of cases that extend over
neighborhood boundaries or that are too complex or specialized
for neighborhoods to handle -- could be addressed by the
creation of "Back-up Centers." These would be intake and
referral centers serving a number of neighborhoods as well as
private and governmental dispute resolution organizations.
The Back-up centers could provide training in mediation and
other related processes and ongoing training for intake
specialists, helping them for example, to recognize the
problems associated with special areas such as consumer
problems, the problems of women and the low income people, and
opportunities for group claims.
Instead of being administered only by the courts or bar
associations, Back-up Centers could be jointly owned and
operated by the dispute resolution organizations they would
serve. This auspice might include not only neighborhood
organizations but also governmental and private
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organizations. A management structure which was consciously
designed to reflect the interests of a variety of dispute
resolution organizations (the management structure could be
made up of a tripartite government, private, community team
just like the planning committees) would have a number of
advantages, including the encouragement of autonomy and
innovation in existing groups.
Several theorists, for example, have argued that the
traditional organization is a "circle" with management in the
middle and all of the rest of the groups that make up the
organization in the periphery of the circle. (Schon, 1971,
Graybow and Heskin, 1976) This is called by Donald Schon the
"center-periphery model." Some innovative management models
try to reduce the role of the "center" by having groups from
around the periphery take on management functions. This
structure has the effect of encouraging and supporting the
real innovations which frequently lie in the peripheral
groups, rather than depending merely on the center to make
policy without direct knowledge of their needs and ideas of
the periphery.
A joint management structure for an intake and referral
process, in addition to encouraging the innovative potential
of individual organizations, would have other important
advantages. In particular, it has the potential to become an
educational forum, to conduct research, and to formulate
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public policy.
First, the center might undertake a series of workshops
to establish flexible protocols for issue specific intake
problems. Through this type of educational process people
could be brought together who are interested in a particular
issue -- such as violence against women, tenant landlord
problems, or consumer issues. From their discussions, the
complex social, psychological, and legal problems that
underlies these issues might then be sorted into flexible
protocols that individual programs would be free to adopt.
Together, these two ideas -- Neighborhood Multidoor
Dispute Resolution and Planning Centers and Back-up Centers --
address a number of the concerns about the ADR Movement
suggested throughout this paper -- concerns of access,
effectiveness, and equitable control. The purpose of this
paper, however, is not to design concrete models for
Minnesotans, but to stimulate communities to design their own
models. These ideas are offered only as theoretical
frameworks for a Multidoor planning process - a process with
the goal of encouraging individuals and groups in Minnesota to
develop a mutually agreeable notion of justice and to work
toward accomplishing the goals inspired by that notion.
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CHAPTER FOUR: CONCLUSION
In concept the central goal of the Multidoor Courthouse
is to match citizens' claims with the most "effective" forum
for resolving their disputes. The formation of a Multidoor
Courthouse, however, is a complex social and political process
during which important decisions are made about administrative
control, allocation of funding, and jurisdiction of disputes.
These decisions are likely to have a direct or indirect impact
on how problems are matched with forums, with the results
sometimes being political or economic decisions rather than
being based on concerns of "effectiveness."
Even the brief history of the ADR movement sketched in
Chapter One, tells us that each of the movement's goals --
access, efficiency and community building are not merely
theoretical concepts, but they are theories of justice, based
in social and political movements and on economic
foundations. Cost effectiveness and efficiency, for example,
are part of the business philosophy and practice of court
administrators. This means that if a court system dominated
the design and operation of a Multidoor Courthouse,
"effectiveness" in dispute resolution might mean "cost
effectiveness." On the other hand, if those who are concerned
with access to justice are administering a MDC project,
"effectiveness" is likely to mean the "effective" pressing of
- 77 -
group claims or the prevention of claims involving low income
people and women from going to mediation, where their rights
may be bargained away. These contradictory notions of
"effectiveness" indicate that the matching of problems to
dispute resolution forums is a political and economic process
and will be highly influenced by who administers or controls a
Multidoor Courthouse and how that control shapes the intake
and referral process.
The extent to which these forces shape the Multidoor
concept is evident in the particular structure of each of the
Multidoor pilot projects. Each is different, even in name.
Some are Multidoor butaen, others are Multidoor pisputQe
in erL To what extent are the differences among
these projects a reflection of the needs of the local dispute
resolution environment and to what extent are they due to
political and economic forces exerting control over the
formation and implementation of the MDC for ends unrelated to
community needs?
It can be said that the playing out of political and
economic forces is a natural part of how needs are met in a
democratic society. But, we cannot be certain that needs will
shape the development of a Multidoor Courthouse, as naturally
as political and economic forces. It was with this concern
that I went to Minnesota.
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While studying the Minnesota dispute resolution
environment in more political and social detail than the
Multidoor pilot projects, I found it useful to ask people in
the State what they thought would happen if a Multidoor
Courthouse were developed in Minnesota in the present
environment. The perceptions of the people I interviewed were
very similar and were confirmed by my own observations. The
scenario they describe is the following.
The state and private professional organizations
concerned with dispute resolution have been productive both in
inventing and implementing ADR programs and in creating
funding mechanisms. As in other sites where the courts or bar
associations have been able to gain support and leverage
funding, each of these institutions appears to have the
ability and influence to administer a MDC.
Within the government, there seem to be two main actors
that are influential in ADR decision making. One is made up
of the group of court administrators in state, county and
municipal courts, and the other main actor is the State
Planning Office. Government control of a MDC would mean
either vesting authority in one of these groups or developing
a high level of cooperation between them.
In addition, there are innovators in the community that
would likely play a role in the development of a Multidoor
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Courthouse. The Mediation Center would be an obvious actor in
light of its status and backing in the professional community,
and the interest of its director in the Multidoor Courthouse
concept.
Control over development and administration of a MDC
could go to any of the above groups or some combination of
them. However, if this were to occur it is unlikely that the
development of a MDC would reflect the needs and interests of
the many community organizations and social networks that make
up the neighborhoods. This could mean that claims of low
income people, minorities, women, tenants, and consumers would
be shunted into alternative dispute resolution processes, when
they may be more appropriately addressed in a class action
suit or by individual legal representation. It may also mean
that competition with the Multidoor Courthouse may prevent
communities from identifying problems that can better be
addressed in community building forums, such as community
boards programs. Neither of these are desirable outcomes in a
community that values public participation, consensus decision
making and decentralization.
In order to insure that the needs of community
organizations and the neighborhoods are met, I have developed
the participatory planning process described in Chapter
Three. While the planning process is an opportunity to
discover and encourage diverse interests, it is also a format
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for cetting the political and economic agendas of the key
stakeholders out on the table. The goal of this process is to
come up with an outcome that serves the interests of as many
groups as possible, minimizing the harm to any individual
group.
While the above concerns persuaded me that a
participatory planning process should be designed, an equally
compelling argument is that participatory decision making is
central to the idea of "effective" dispute resolution. The
determination of what is an effective dispute resolution
process may be dependent upon understanding the experience and
perspective of those who both provide and receive the variety
of services that surround the prevention and resolution of
disputes. In the community, this means tapping the network of
people who on a day-to-day basis are involved with services
like legal assistance, shelter for battered women, family
services, healthcare, and job training. Only by debate and
planning between these groups of people will the realities of
"effective" dispute resolution processing be discovered.
These are the people who know from a working perspective what
the dangers and advantages of mediation are; what the
tradeoffs are of a group claim versus an individual claim; or
what the significance is of sending a physical abuse claim to
a prosecutor.
There are, of course, both strengths and weaknesses to
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the planning process I have proposed. On one hand, the
inclusiveness and openness of the planning structure creates
flexibility. On the other hand, they open the door to
co-optation and the undue influence of individuals. In
Minnesota, however, it appears that there are several factors
that reduce the likelihood of these problems occurring.
First, there is a relative balance of power between the three
participating groups. Second, there is a well respected forum
perceived as neutral - the Conflict Analysis Center. Finally,
there is the experience and resources of the St. Paul NIS
experiment to draw upon.
The possibility that these or similar factors would n14
be present in other regions where a MDC is being considered
makes me extremely cautious about transplanting this planning
model to cities other than Minnesota. What I would like to
see is this experimentation in planning take place in
Minnesota, and the models created there be studied by other
regions that are less inclined toward participatory planning.
An example of one such model would be the jointly owned and
managed "Back-up center" described in Chapter Three. The
Back-up center is a forum for education, training, determining
criteria for "effective" dispute resolution, and policy
planning. This center has the advantage of protection of the
public interest without the necessity for large scale
community planning.
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